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HOW THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT 
SAVED THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE  
Richard Primus*†
INTRODUCTION 
 
For all the drama surrounding the Commerce Clause challenge to the in-
dividual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“PPACA”),1
My focus is the role of United States v. Lopez, in which the Supreme 
Court famously struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as be-
yond Congress’s power to enact under the Commerce Clause.
 the doctrinal question presented is simple. Under existing 
doctrine, the provision is as valid as can be. To be sure, the Supreme Court 
could alter existing doctrine, and many interesting things could be written 
about the dynamics that sometimes prompt judges to strike out in new direc-
tions under the pressures of cases like this one. But it is not my intention to 
pursue that possibility here. My own suspicion, for what it is worth, is that 
the Supreme Court will abide by its previously announced doctrines and 
uphold the individual mandate. So I mean to engage U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services v. Florida as the easy case it is and to explore 
an underappreciated feature of how it came to be so easy.   
2 In the 
conventional telling, Lopez (along with its sidekick, United States v. Morri-
son3
I think this conventional telling may be backwards. That is, I think it 
nearer the truth to say that Lopez may be the PPACA’s salvation—that with-
out Lopez, the individual mandate would be considerably more precarious. 
) is the source of the doctrinal threat to the PPACA’s individual 
mandate. Before Lopez, the Supreme Court had settled into the practice of 
upholding pretty much anything that Congress claimed to be within its 
commerce power, largely on the strength of the econometrically undeniable 
proposition that every law that does anything (or at least every law that does 
anything to a lot of people) has effects on interstate commerce. But for 
Lopez, the conventional view therefore runs, we would live for practical 
purposes in a world of plenary federal power. Courts would not take Com-
merce Clause challenges seriously, and any attack on the PPACA would 
have to be mounted on other grounds.  
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Jessica Morton 
and Samuel Rudman. 
 † Suggested citation: Richard Primus, Commentary, How the Gun-Free School Zones 
Act Saved the Individual Mandate, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44 (2012), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/primus.pdf. 
 1. Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  
 2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
 3. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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I say this not because Lopez announced some rule that creates a safe har-
bor for the individual mandate. On its face, Commerce Clause doctrine 
was obviously more favorable to federal regulation on the day before Lopez 
was decided than on the day after. I say it instead for two other reasons, one 
practical and one discursive.  
The practical reason is located in the common law dynamics of Supreme 
Court decisionmaking. Lopez announced limits on the commerce power, but 
it also forced the Court in later cases to articulate rules that would limit 
those limits. Without Lopez there would be no Gonzales v. Raich,4
Then there is the discursive reason. As a matter of the dynamics of 
American constitutional discourse, the Supreme Court feels pulled to show 
respect for the maxim that the federal government is one of limited and 
enumerated powers. But having demonstrated that respect in Lopez (and 
Morrison), it need not do so again and again and again: Lopez (and Morri-
son) may be enough to let the Court look itself in the eye as it recites the 
maxim, and that may be all that is necessary. On the other hand, if the mod-
ern Court had not yet demonstrated that it takes the enumerated powers 
maxim seriously, the urge to do so now might be irresistible.  
 and it is 
Raich that makes upholding the individual mandate so blisteringly easy as a 
matter of doctrine.  
In what follows, I will first explain why the individual mandate is within 
Congress’s Article I power under existing doctrine. That will happen quick-
ly. As I’ve said, the question is pretty easy, and there is no need to tarry over 
it. I will then move to something a bit more subtle: the idea that Lopez has 
made the world safe for the PPACA.  
I. 
Here, in four sentences that would be uncontroversial if health insurance 
reform were not a divisive political issue, is the explanation of why enacting 
the individual mandate is within Congress’s power. (1) Congress has the 
power to regulate interstate commerce, including the power to regulate eco-
nomic activities with substantial effects on interstate commerce.5 (2) The 
health insurance market is either an interstate commercial market or, at the 
very least, a market with massive effects on interstate commerce. (3) When 
Congress uses its commerce power to regulate with a comprehensive legal 
scheme, it may under the Necessary and Proper Clause make rules for 
things that are themselves neither interstate nor commercial, if those rules 
are necessary for effecting the policy of the regulatory scheme overall.6
                                                                                                                      
 4. 545 U.S. 1 (2004).  
 (4) 
The PPACA regulates the health insurance market comprehensively, and the 
individual mandate is necessary for making that comprehensive regulatory 
scheme work.  
 5. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.  
 6. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18; id. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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That’s pretty much it. If there are remaining niceties, they have been thor-
oughly addressed in opinions by Judges Lawrence Silberman and Jeffrey 
Sutton.7 To be sure, the individual mandate is enormously controversial as a 
political matter, and we have all observed that certain kinds of political con-
troversy get articulated in the language of constitutional objection. Indeed, 
such objections are sometimes felt powerfully enough among the 
decisionmaking class as to prompt a change in constitutional doctrine. This 
is a basic dynamic of living constitutionalism. But if the question before us 
is how settled constitutional law bears on the individual mandate, we need 
say no more. As John Marshall almost put the point, whether the PPACA’s 
individual mandate provision is within Congress’s commerce power “is a 
question deeply interesting to the United States,” but it is “not of an intrica-
cy proportioned to its interest.”8
II. 
 
What is intricate as well as interesting, I think, is the set of forces that 
have made this much-anticipated decision so doctrinally easy. My focus is 
on the role of Lopez—a decision that I see as a critical step toward uphold-
ing the individual mandate. That may seem unorthodox, given that Lopez 
represents the contemporary Court’s commitment to putting limits on the 
commerce power. But fans of the individual mandate are deeply fortunate 
that Lopez was decided as it was. As noted above, there are two reasons 
why, one rooted in the common law process of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking and one located in the dynamics of American constitutional 
discourse. 
A. Common Law Process 
Lopez imposed limits on the commerce power for the first time in dec-
ades. But Lopez did not undo all of the ways in which the world changed 
during those decades, and the Court has not been so impractical or so ideo-
logically blinkered as to think that it can fully turn back the clock. Instead, 
the Court has recognized that we live now under conditions of pervasive 
federal regulation, much of which it would be foolish to eliminate. Once 
Lopez was on the books, therefore, its holding forced the Court to engage 
seriously with the question of how constitutional law could impose a limit 
on the commerce power while still permitting the elaborate edifice of feder-
al law that keeps modern America running. That engagement took the form 
of normal common law development: here a case limiting a principle that 
should not be too far extended, there a case refining a rule that was stated 
too crudely before.  
                                                                                                                      
 7. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549–66 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part). 
 8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
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The high moment of this process to date has been Gonzales v. Raich, in 
which the Court upheld a provision of the federal Controlled Substances Act 
as applied to an individual citizen growing marijuana for his own noncom-
mercial use. Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Raich stands as one of the 
most cogent expositions of the commerce power ever written. With its clear-
sighted view of the difference (and interaction) between the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia’s opinion credi-
bly explains both the impermissibility of far-flung, scattershot federal laws 
like the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the validity of the comprehensive 
federal regulatory schemes on which the modern American economy now 
depends. The Commerce Clause itself, the opinion teaches, reaches only 
interstate commerce, defined in terms of the three categories—channels, 
instrumentalities, and substantial effects—that Lopez deems regulable.9
It is Raich, therefore, that makes upholding the individual mandate so 
straightforward. In my earlier four-sentence explanation of the validity of 
the individual mandate, sentence (3) and perhaps also sentence (4) owe not 
just their authority but also their crisp formulation to Raich, and in particular 
to Justice Scalia’s analysis in that case. Without Raich, the Supreme Court 
would approach the PPACA and individual mandate without the benefit of a 
prominent, well-articulated, ready-to-hand framework explaining that oth-
erwise ultra vires congressional action can be unproblematically within 
Congress’s power if it is an integral part of a larger legal scheme regulating 
interstate commerce.  
 But 
when Congress enacts a regulatory scheme whose object lies within those 
categories, its chosen implementation may also reach beyond those catego-
ries. If need be, it may reach into space that is neither interstate nor 
commercial, so long as the implementing regulation is an integral part of the 
overall scheme authorized by the commerce power.  
To be sure, there is no conceptual reason why that framework had to be 
articulated in Raich rather than awaiting articulation in Department of 
Health and Human Services. Either set of facts would make it appropriate 
for the deciding Court to explain that a challenged provision that by itself 
might not regulate interstate commerce is valid if part of a larger system that 
does regulate interstate commerce. But as observers of common law devel-
opment know, not every case is an equally likely occasion for every possible 
doctrinal development. Principles are refined when refinement is needed, 
and whether a refinement is needed is something that the particular court 
applying the doctrine decides. When faced with the alternative of undermin-
ing congressional drug policy and permitting Angel Raich to grow his 
marijuana, the Rehnquist Court was moved to refine its doctrine and allow 
federal law to stand. It is far less clear that the Roberts Court would feel the 
need to refine doctrine in order to sustain the individual mandate.  
So: Without Raich, the Court would lack a framework that cogently ex-
plains why permitting the individual mandate to stand does not mean 
permitting Congress to do anything it likes. And Raich as we know it came 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Raich, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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into being because of Lopez (and Morrison). Without Lopez (and Morrison), 
the justices would not have needed to articulate any complex or refined the-
ory in order to uphold a portion of the Controlled Substances Act.  
To be sure, it is also true that without Lopez (and Morrison) the Court 
could not strike down the individual mandate on the authority of Lopez (or 
Morrison). But the problem that sank the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 
Lopez would still be deployed against the individual mandate, even if Lopez 
had never been decided. The party challenging the statute would contend 
that to permit this federal law is to say that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
anything, and that just cannot be. Without Raich, the justices might not have 
already formulated (and committed to writing) the insight that permitting a 
rule as part of a general regulatory scheme is not the same as permitting any 
rule at all. Unless the justices were willing to work to find that answer with 
the PPACA before them, the individual mandate would fall. And it is not 
clear that the Roberts Court would see the incipient death of the individual 
mandate as a sign that something was going wrong, such that doctrinal re-
finement would be necessary to set things right. 
B. The Dynamics of Constitutional Discourse 
As part of their socialization into the world of American constitutional 
law, lawyers learn the maxim that the federal government is one of limited 
and enumerated powers. For a long portion of the twentieth century, expert 
observers could be forgiven for wondering whether that maxim had remain-
ing force. But the maxim never disappeared: it was never consigned to the 
dustbin of constitutional expressions. It stayed around, repeated from teach-
er to student as a living idea. Even most supporters of strong federal power 
were loath to jettison the enumerated powers maxim as a matter of principle. 
At no point in our post-1937 history does one find judges or law professors 
routinely or ordinarily contending that the federal government has plenary 
power. To be sure, many people felt that the federal government had some-
thing close to plenary power in practice, such that the maxim that the federal 
government is one of limited and enumerated powers was essentially a nos-
trum devoid of meaningful present content. But for a great many well-
socialized American lawyers—perhaps enough to claim the mainstream of 
constitutional discourse—the phrase “our federal government is one of lim-
ited and enumerated powers” was always one that induced head-nodding, at 
least as a matter of principle.  
To utter this maxim is to engage in a profession of faith. For many 
American lawyers, declaring that the federal government is one of limited 
and enumerated powers is a way of showing fidelity to the Founders’ de-
sign, to American tradition, to the structure of the document, and perhaps to 
their own experience of induction into the discipline of constitutional law. 
To disavow the maxim officially would be to break faith along all of these 
dimensions. Constitutional law has tolerated tremendous expansions of fed-
eral power in practice, as the logic of modern life has directed. But it has 
proved easier to tolerate those expansions while continuing to pay homage 
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to the maxim than to repudiate the maxim openly. A piece of our identity is 
invested in the maxim: articulating it reminds us of a part of who we are, or 
of a story in which we locate ourselves.  
Lopez was decided as it was partly because a majority of the Court felt 
that it could not uphold the Gun-Free School Zones Act and still utter the 
maxim. At oral argument in the case, the Solicitor General of the United 
States was asked to identify a law that the federal government could not 
make if the statute at issue were upheld. He could not provide an example.10
That said, the maxim does not demand that the Supreme Court constant-
ly strike down federal laws. It demands only evidence that it is taken 
seriously. Lopez and Morrison insulate the Court against charges of heresy 
on the point—not perfectly, but considerably more than would be the case 
had those decisions not been rendered. In later cases, the Court can uphold 
far-reaching exercises of the commerce power without laying itself as open 
to the claim that it has let the maxim come to nothing.
 
In the absence of such an example, and once the question had been asked, 
those justices most concerned with limiting federal power (or keeping faith 
with certain inherited maxims) could surely have felt that upholding the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act would have made the hallowed phrase unsaya-
ble. Seen in this light, the Court’s decision in Lopez was partly a 
compulsory demonstration of bona fides. If you really believe in this max-
im, the contention ran—and of course you do—then there can be no 
justification for your upholding the statute. Or put the other way, if you up-
hold the statute, you will be forever estopped from claiming that you honor 
this traditional maxim. You will be, to that extent, a heretic. And if you are 
supposed to be the guardian of the principles at whose articulation well-
socialized constitutional lawyers nod their heads, a heretic is an uncomfort-
able thing to be. 
11 When it upholds 
other federal statutes, the Court can identify concrete examples of laws that 
are beyond the commerce power, laws with respect to which it has exercised 
its solemn duty to police the boundaries of federal legislative power.12
Now imagine the counterfactual world in which the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act had not come before the Supreme Court. The Court’s case law 
would not include Lopez’s demonstration of fidelity. For simplicity’s sake, 
assume also that there was no Morrison. To those justices for whom it mat-
ters, the anxiety that the enumerated powers maxim has been abandoned 
would be more potent than it is today, and the payoff for holding some law 
to be beyond the commerce power would be commensurately greater. So if 
the PPACA and its individual mandate were to come before a Court that had 
 So 
when it upholds other laws as within the commerce power, it can adduce 
evidence that it has not left the maxim empty. 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Oral Argument at 4:52, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260#argument.  
 11. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).  
 12. See e.g., id. at 1963 (citing Lopez, 516 U.S. at 567); Raich, 514 U.S. at 23 (citing 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549).  
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not yet stood up for the maxim, several justices might experience a deeply 
powerful pull toward demonstrating fidelity to the maxim, especially in light 
of the public salience of the decision. With no Raich framework on the 
books, the doctrinal path to that demonstration of fidelity would be easier 
than the one that now exists. And one need not be a crude attitudinalist to 
think that this Court would need less than overwhelmingly favorable condi-
tions to be convinced to rule against the PPACA. 
CONCLUSION 
My argument has been both anticipatory and speculative. If the Court 
strikes down the individual mandate, my thoughts here may come to seem 
quaint or benighted or naïve. And even if the Court upholds the mandate, as 
I expect it to do, I will not be able to prove what would have happened in a 
world without the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Not knowing the contents of 
other people’s minds, I can make no conclusive statements about the extent 
to which the dynamics I have described operate, consciously or uncon-
sciously, within the decisionmaking process of any given justice. This is 
particularly true of my claims about the role of the enumerated powers max-
im in American constitutional discourse. Nonetheless, the thought 
experiment I have rehearsed has value in thinking about the dynamics of 
American constitutional law. Among other things, it makes the point that the 
alternative to the world of Lopez is probably not a world where the federal 
judiciary merrily dispensed with any impulse to honor the idea of limited 
federal power. It is more likely a world where that impulse had not yet been 
given expression and force in a modern Supreme Court decision. Discourses 
evolve, and sometimes hallowed maxims disappear. But while they live, 
they can be mobilized. And sometimes they lie about like loaded weapons. 
Lopez dissipated our constitutional culture’s discursive pressure to vin-
dicate the enumerated powers maxim. Not entirely, of course—some people 
who recognize that the individual mandate is within the commerce power 
under present doctrine continue to worry that the Court is not giving the 
enumerated powers maxim its full due.13
In his dissent in Lopez, Justice David Souter wrote that it would be a 
mistake to think of the decision rendered that day as a minor development in 
 But one or two examples of taking 
the maxim seriously do infinitely more to allay that worry than zero exam-
ples would. Just as importantly, Lopez set in motion a process of common-
law refinement that by 2006 produced an articulate framework for uphold-
ing pervasive federal regulation. Forced to live in the modern world, Lopez 
begot Raich, and Raich makes upholding the individual mandate easy. Stat-
ed differently, Raich requires the Court to work hard to explain why the 
mandate is unconstitutional, whereas before Raich greater effort would have 
been required to show that the mandate was valid. And the burden of cogni-
tive effort can matter a great deal, especially when combined with a Court’s 
inclination to go one way or another in the first place. 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See e.g., Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 549–66 (Sutton, J., concurring in part). 
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the law. It is sometimes the case, he wrote, that one does not realize how 
important a decision will become until years later, when one sees the course 
on which that decision set the law. At a certain level of generality, Justice 
Souter’s observation is surely correct. But Justice Souter’s point was that 
Lopez could be the beginning of a large rollback of the commerce power, 
one that could imperil the world of federal regulation in which his genera-
tion had always lived. So far, that has not come to pass. Instead, one of the 
most consequential effects of Lopez may be the development of a more sta-
ble rubric for upholding comprehensive federal regulation—a rubric that has 
more or less by accident taken shape just in time to preserve one of the most 
ambitious federal laws in American history. 
